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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Abraham Scraggins, Jr., appeals from the district court's orders revoking 
his probation, claiming the district court violated his due process rights by 
revoking probation for violations "previously punished through the intermediate 
sanction of discretionary jail time." 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Scragg ins with, and he pled guilty to, failing to register 
as a sex offender in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-7354. (R., pp.21-22, 27-
28.) The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed Scragg ins on probation for ten years, 
imposing a number of conditions of probation and authorizing "180 days 
discretionary jail time, to be served at PO's request without prior approval." (R., 
pp.31-37.) Approximately one year later, the state filed a motion for probation 
violation alleging Scragg ins violated his probation by consuming alcohol and 
failing stay at his registered address for a nine-day period. (R., pp.45-47.) 
One month after the state moved to revoke Scraggins' probation in Case 
No. CR-FE-2009-7354, the state charged Scraggins in Case No. CR-FE-2009-
20101 with two counts of failing to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.101-102.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Scragg ins pled guilty to one count of failing to 
register as a sex offender as alleged in Case No. CR-FE-2009-20101 and to the 
allegation that he violated his probation in Case No. CR-FE-2009-7354 by failing 
to stay at his registered address. (R., p.115.) 
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The court revoked Scraggins' probation in Case No. CR-FE-2009-7354, ordered 
his sentence executed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.59-60.) The court 
simultaneously imposed a unified ten-year sentence with five and one-half years 
fixed in Case No. CR-FE-2009-20101 and retained jurisdiction in that case as 
well. (R., pp.119-121.) At the end of the retained jurisdiction review period, the 
court placed Scraggins on probation in both cases subject to several conditions 
and again authorized 1S0 days of discretionary jail time. (R., pp.65-70, 125-131.) 
Less than two months later, the state filed a motion for probation violation 
in both cases alleging Scragg ins violated his probation by possessing a weapon, 
failing to abide by the curfew imposed by his probation officer, consuming and/or 
possessing alcohol, having contact with D.H.1 contrary to his probation officer's 
orders, and failing to pay court-ordered fines, fees, and/or costs. (R., pp.7S-S0, 
139-141.) The state also alleged Scraggins violated his probation in Case No. 
CR-FE-2009-7354 by failing to reimburse the county for his public defender 
services. (R., p.79.) Prior to filing the motions to revoke, Scraggins served ten 
days of discretionary jail time for the same conduct that formed the basis of the 
alleged probation violations. As explained by the prosecutor: 
. . . Probation Officers Lakey (phonetic) and Colson arrested 
Scraggins on 7/7 after finding him in violation of curfew, inebriated 
and with admissions of violating the no contact order with [D.H.]. 
Mr. Scraggins['] probation officer Lori Peno was out of town or on 
vacation or something of that nature. She was out of town at the 
time anyway. That he was arrested [sic]. So these other probation 
officers Lakey and Colson put him in jail on discretionary time. 
1 D.H. was the victim in the case which resulted in Scraggins' obligation to 
register as a sex offender. (Indictment filed February 25, 1993, attached to PSI.) 
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It appears based on the computer system that he was in jail 
from July 7th from [sic] to July 17th at which time he was released. 
He was instructed to make an office visit with Officer Peno on the 
19th and did meet with her out of custody. At which time he gave a 
little bit more information to her about -- or more in depth 
information about his contact with [D.H.]. 
Following that it was determined by Officer Peno that his 
violations in fact warranted a probation violation and not just leaving 
it at the discretionary jail time. So notwithstanding him having done 
discretionary jail time, he was arrested on an agent's warrant at that 
time. 
(10/14/2010 Tr., p.69, L.16-p.70, L.14.) 
Scraggins ultimately admitted violating his probation in both cases by 
failing to abide by curfew, consuming andlor possessing alcohol, and having 
prohibited contact with D.H.; the state dismissed the remaining allegations. (R., 
p.146.) At the disposition hearing, Scraggins objected to the court considering 
revoking his probation, claiming the court was precluded from doing so since he 
had already served discretionary jail time for the violations. (10/14/2010 Tr., 
p.72, L.2 - p.73, L.2.) According to Scraggins, revoking his probation under the 
circumstances would violate his due process rights because it "changes the 
sentence." (10/14/2010 Tr., p.72, Ls.12-13.) The court rejected Scraggins' 
argument, revoked his probation in both cases and ordered his sentences 
executed. (10/14/2010 Tr., p.73, L.3 - p.74, L.20; R., pp.89-91, 150-152.) 
Scraggins timely appealed. (R., pp.92-94, 153-155.) Pursuant to 
Scraggins' motion, both of his cases were consolidated for appeal. (Motion to 
Consolidate dated December 6,2010; R., pp.3-4.) 
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ISSUE 
Scraggins states the issue on appeal as: 
Does the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit 
a district court to revoke probation for past violations which were 
previously punished through the intermediate sanction of 
discretionary jail time? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.S.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Scragg ins failed to establish that revocation of probation for the same 
underlying conduct that served as the basis for discretionary jail time implicates 
due process, much less violates it? 
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ARGUMENT 
Scraggins Has Failed To Establish That Revocation Of Probation For The Same 
Conduct That Served As The Basis For Discretionary Jail Time Implicates Due 
Process. Much Less Violates It 
A. Introduction 
Scraggins argues "his right to due process was violated when his 
probation was revoked based on three probation violations that had already been 
punished through the intermediate sanction of ten days of discretionary jail time." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Scraggins' claim fails. Revocation of probation for 
conduct that also served as the basis for discretionary jail time does not implicate 
due process, much less violate it. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court 
exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex reI. 
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630 
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted). 
A district court's decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105-106, 233 P.3d 33, 36-37 
(2009). 
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C. Scraggins' Due Process Claim Fails Because Revocation Of Probation 
For The Same Conduct That Served As The Basis For Discretionary Jail 
Time Does Not Implicate Due Process, Much Less Violate It 
Scraggins argues, as he did below, that the district court could not revoke 
his probation based upon the same conduct that also served as the basis for 
discretionary jail time because, Scragg ins asserts, to do so violates due process. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-14.) In support of this argument, Scraggins relies on the 
United States Supreme Court's opinions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-
11.) Neither Morrissey nor Scarpelli, however, support Scraggins' due process 
claim. 
In Morrisey, the Supreme Court held that a parolee facing revocation is 
entitled to due process in the form of: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure 
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard 
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) 
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless 
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 
408 U.S. at 489. One year later, the Court in Scarpelli held that probationers, like 
parolees, are also entitled to due process prior to revocation. 411 U.S. at 782, 
786. 
Scragg ins recognizes that neither Morrissey nor Scarpelli "explicitly 
address the issue before the Court in this case," but contends "the principles 
announced in those cases demand a conclusion that probation cannot, 
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consistent with the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, be 
revoked based solely on past violations that were previously punished through 
imposition of discretionary jail time." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) In particular, 
Scraggins argues: 
"[F]undamental fairness" is "the touchstone of due process," as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 
790, and it is fundamentally unfair to punish a probationer for 
certain probation violations through the imposition of discretionary 
jail time (for which he receives no credit against the underlying 
sentence) then, after he has completed that discretionary jail time, 
punish him a second time by revoking his probation and sending 
him to the penitentiary to serve more time in incarceration for the 
very same probation violations. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12 (alteration and emphasis original).) 
While fundamental fairness is the reason due process is afforded in 
probation revocation proceedings, it is not a freestanding claim that allows a 
defendant to avoid proving a violation of a recognized due process right, which in 
the probation revocation context would be one of the six rights articulated in 
Morrissey. Scraggins does not contend that any of these specific due process 
rights were violated nor could he because he was afforded all of his rights during 
the course of his probation revocation proceedings. 
Although framed as a due process violation, Scragg ins' argument is 
essentially a double jeopardy argument in that he is complaining it is unfair to 
punish him twice for the same conduct. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) However, 
it is well-established in Idaho that a probationer is not entitled to credit for time 
served for discretionary jail time that is served as a condition of probation. State 
v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 43 P.3d 765 (2002); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 922 
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P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 1996). Indeed, this is true even if the discretionary jail time 
results in a period of incarceration that exceeds the statutory maximum. Dana, 
137 Idaho at 8, 43 P.3d at 767. Scraggins cannot avoid binding precedent 
simply by restating the same essential argument as a violation of due process. 
Further, Scraggins' characterization of discretionary jail time and probation 
revocation as "punishment" for a probation violation is not well-taken. "The 
purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated 
under proper control and supervision." State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 860, 
452 P.2d 350, 357 (1969) (citing State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 706 
(1968)). Discretionary jail time is not "punishment"; it is a tool to motivate a 
defendant's compliance with the terms of probation while still affording him the 
opportunity to rehabilitate in the community. See Dana, 137 Idaho at 8,43 P.3d 
at 767. Revocation also does not constitute "punishment" for a particular 
violation; rather, it is what occurs when the defendant's conduct demonstrates 
that probation is not achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is not consistent with 
the protection of society. State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. 
App. 1992). The only "punishment" the defendant suffers when probation is 
revoked is that which was originally imposed for the crime of conviction. 
Scraggins' claim that imposition of discretionary jail time and subsequent 
revocation of probation based upon the same conduct is unconstitutional 
punishment fails. 
Scraggins also argues that revocation of probation based upon conduct 
that also formed the basis of discretionary jail time violates the "implied" "promise 
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that the government will punish a violation either through intermediate sanctions 
or revocation, but not both." (Appellant's Brief, p.12 (emphasis original).) 
According to Scraggins, "without such a promise, the probationer would have 
minimal incentive to accept the intermediate sanction and continue on probation; 
in many cases, the probationer would be wise to simply withdraw from probation 
and begin serving his sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) In addition to the fact 
that Scraggins cites no authority for the proposition that the claimed implied 
promise actually exists, this argument suffers from at least two other flaws. First, 
while a defendant may elect to forego probation and its conditions and simply 
serve his sentence, the state is unaware of any authority that allows a 
probationer to accept or reject discretionary jail time and just "begin serving his 
sentence." Second, Scraggins' argument is inconsistent with the principle that 
"facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation" are all relevant 
to a revocation decision. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 
(Ct. App. 2009). If Scraggins' argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a court 
would never be able to consider anything other than the conduct that resulted in 
the probation violation allegations at issue at the time of revocation. This is not 
only inconsistent with the law, it is illogical and poor public policy, particularly in 
light of the purpose of probation. 
Finally, Scragg ins claims "other courts have provided some persuasive 
guidance" "dealing with situations such as the one that is present in this case." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Specifically, Scragg ins cites Byrd v. Caswell, 34 P.3d 
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647 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 2001), Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248 (Tex Ct. Crim. 
App. 1982), and Wright v. State, 640 S.W.2d 265 (1982). (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.12-13.) These cases are not relevant to the issue "present in this case," much 
less persuasive. 
At issue in Byrd was whether an Oklahoma statute that required the state 
to prove grounds for a probation revocation within 20 days of arraignment 
prevented the state from dismissing and refiling the allegations when it could not 
comply with the 20-day deadline. 34 P.3d at 648. The court held that the statute 
did prevent such action. !5i at 649. This conclusion in no way informs the due 
process inquiry in this case. 
The question in Rogers was whether, for purposes of due process, there 
was a legitimate distinction between continuing disposition on proven probation 
violation allegations to allow the probationer to demonstrate he was still a good 
candidate for probation and actually disposing of the alleged violation by 
continuing the probationer on probation. 640 S.W.2d at 250. A panel of the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held there was not and, as such, in order to 
revoke probation at the conclusion of a continued disposition, the probationer 
was entitled to notice and a hearing. 640 S.W.2d at 255. Following a second 
petition for rehearing, the court ultimately affirmed the order revoking probation 
because the due process claim previously decided by the court was not 
preserved, but stated it adhered to the following principle: 
[W]e agree that the distinction between "continuing the probation" 
and "continuing the hearing" is irrelevant to the question of what 
process is due when the trial court finally takes away the 
probationer's liberty. Further, we agree with the majority on original 
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rehearing that due process mandates another determination that 
the probationer has breached the conditions of probation after he 
has been returned to probation (or that there is newly discovered 
evidence of a previous violation which was not known at the time of 
the first revocation hearing). And this new determination must 
occur at another revocation hearing for which the probationer has 
been served with a new motion to revoke giving him proper notice 
as required by due process. 
Rogers, 640 S.W.2d at 263 (emphasis original). 
The foregoing principle, however, has no bearing on the issue in this case 
because there is a fundamental difference between Scraggins and the 
probationer in Rogers - unlike Rogers, Scraggins' probation was not revoked 
"after he had been returned to probation." Accordingly, due process did not 
require a "new motion to revoke giving him proper notice" or a hearing. 
A panel of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the same issue 
in Wright that was addressed in Rogers and held: "When a probationer is 
returned to probation, . . . probation may not be revoked without any 
determination of a new violation." 640 S.W.2d at 270. As in Rogers, the trial 
court was ultimately affirmed on rehearing because the issue had not been 
preserved. ~ Nevertheless, Wright is not instructive to the issue in this case 
for the same reasons Rogers is not. 
Because Scraggins has failed to establish his due process rights were 
implicated when the district court revoked his probation for the same conduct that 
served as the basis for his discretionary jail time, much less that any of his due 




The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's orders 
revoking Scraggins' probation. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 2011. 
I 
JE ICA M. LORELLO 
De uty Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of October, 2011, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
ERIK LEHTINEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JMUpm 
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